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CAN YOU JUDGE YOUR FOOD BY
LOOKING AT ITS COVER?
HOW COURTS’ APPLICATION OF FEDERAL
PREEMPTION ALLOWS MISLEADING FOOD
LABELING TO SLIP THROUGH
THE REGULATORY CRACKS
INTRODUCTION
Recent years have experienced a sharp influx of food labeling law-
suits in the form of nationwide class actions against large food manu-
facturers that have allegedly labeled their products in a deceitful
manner.1  As a result, the Northern District of California, being the
most popular venue for such suits, has come to be nicknamed the
“Food Court.”2  The food labeling suits are typically brought by pri-
vate plaintiffs who challenge the labeling3 of packaged food on the
basis that they contain technical violations of the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA) and its implementing regulations, or on the
basis that they are otherwise misleading to consumers.4  Plaintiffs
favor the forum because California law has been especially accommo-
dating to these types of claims.5  California law has created broad
causes of action, requiring plaintiffs to allege only that they had pur-
chased a particular product and that the product’s label is “likely to
deceive a reasonable consumer.”6  Courts have also declared that
whether a label is misleading is rarely determined at the pleading
stage.7
However, defendants in food labeling suits have found express fed-
eral preemption to provide a successful alternate avenue for dismissal.
1. Trends in Food Labeling Class Action Litigation, EDGEWORTH ECON. (Sept. 16, 2013),
http://www.edgewortheconomics.com/experience-and-news/news-and-press-releases/article:09-
10-2013-trends-in-food-labeling-class-action-litigation/.
2. Anthony J. Anscombe & Mary Beth Buckley, Jury Still Out on the “Food Court”: An Ex-
amination of Food Law Class Actions and the Popularity of the Northern District of California,
14 Class Action Litig. Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 800 (July 12, 2013).
3. The FDCA defines “[l]abeling” to mean “all labels and other written, printed, or graphic
matter (1) upon any article or any of its containers or wrappers, or (2) accompanying such arti-
cle.”  21 U.S.C. § 321(m) (2012).
4. Anscombe & Buckley, supra note 2, at 801.
5. Id. at 801–02.
6. Williams v. Gerber Prods. Co., 552 F.3d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 2008).
7. Id.
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A claim can be dismissed on the basis that it is barred by federal law,
namely the FDCA and its implementing regulations promulgated by
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).8  The FDCA provides re-
quirements that food products and their labels must meet in order to
avoid being deemed “misbranded.”9  The Nutrition Labeling Educa-
tion Act of 1990 (NLEA) amended the FDCA’s section on misbrand-
ing.10  In doing so, it added a preemption clause that expressly
prohibits states from imposing labeling requirements that are not
identical to those provided in certain subsections of the FDCA.11
Courts have found deceptive food labeling claims to be barred under
the NLEA’s preemption clause when the plaintiff’s claim sought to
impose requirements different than or in addition to the preemptive
FDCA requirements.12
The precise meaning and scope of the language of the NLEA’s pre-
emption clause is somewhat uncertain.  However, courts have begun
to apply it in a broad manner that keeps meritorious consumer suits
out of court.13  This Comment argues that courts should construe the
NLEA’s preemption clause more narrowly, so as to allow more state
law challenges to misleading labeling practices.  Part II provides back-
ground information on the FDA’s authority to regulate food labels,
the consumer-protection laws used to litigate most deceptive food la-
beling claims, and courts’ current application of express federal pre-
emption to deceptive labeling claims.14  Part III explores the
ambiguities of the language and scope of the NLEA’s preemption
clause.15  It argues in favor construing the language of the NLEA so as
to reduce its preemptive scope.16  Part IV explores the impact of such
an approach on the states’ role in protecting consumers from decep-
tive labeling.17
8. E.g., Carrea v. Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc., 475 F. App’x 113, 115 (9th Cir. 2012).
9. 21 U.S.C. § 343 (2012).  A food will be deemed misbranded when it falls under one of the
prohibitions or fails to meet one of the requirements provided in the subsections of § 343. Id.
10. Nutrition Labeling and Education Act (NLEA) of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat.
2353 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
11. 21 U.S.C. § 343-1(a).
12. See infra notes 147–71 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 147–71 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 18–71 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 172–270 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 172–270 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 271–97 and accompanying text.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Nutrition
Labeling and Education Act
The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) and its implementing
regulations set out detailed national standards for most food and bev-
erage labeling.18  To do so, the FDCA provides certain requirements
that a product and its label must meet in order to avoid being deemed
“misbranded.”19  Then, it prohibits certain acts related to misbranded
food.20  However, before 1990, the regulations for nutritional informa-
tion only applied to products that voluntarily included it or products
that claimed to be a good source of a nutrient or to be generally nutri-
tious.21  Congress amended the FDCA with the Nutrition Labeling
and Education Act of 1990 (NLEA).22  One purpose of enacting the
NLEA was to create uniform national standards regarding the label-
ing of food and to prevent states from adopting inconsistent require-
ments with respect to the labeling of nutrients.23  Another purpose
was “to ensure consumer access to information about food that is sci-
entifically valid, truthful, reliable, understandable, and non-mislead-
ing, in order to foster more healthful food choices.”24  Specifically, the
NLEA aimed to “clarify and to strengthen the [FDA]’s legal authority
to require nutrition labeling on foods, and to establish the circum-
stances under which claims may be made about nutrients in foods.”25
It was enacted partially in response to pressure from the food indus-
try, as state attorneys general were becoming increasingly involved in
regulating food labeling through consumer-protection laws since the
mid-1980s.26  During this time, the FDA had also taken a more per-
18. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2012); 21 C.F.R. §§ 101–199 (2014).
19. 21 U.S.C. § 343.
20. Id. § 331.  Among these prohibited acts are (1) “[t]he introduction or delivery for intro-
duction into interstate commerce of any food . . . that is . . . misbranded”; (2) “[t]he . . . mis-
branding of any food . . . in interstate commerce”; (2) “[t]he receipt in interstate commerce of
any food . . . that is . . . misbranded, and the delivery or proffered delivery thereof for pay or
otherwise; and (3) “[t]he manufacture, within any Territory of any food . . . that is . . . mis-
branded.” Id. § 331(a), (b), (c), (g).
21. Nutrition Labeling, 38 Fed. Reg. 6951 (Mar. 14, 1973).
22. NLEA, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 21 U.S.C.).
23. 136 CONG. REC. H5840 (daily ed. July 30, 1990) (statement of Rep. Waxman).
24. Gail H. Javitt, Supersizing the Pint-Sized: The Need for FDA-Mandated Child-Oriented
Food Labeling, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 311, 311 (2006) (citing NLEA § 2(b)(1), 104 Stat. at
2356–57; 136 CONG. REC. 35,093, 35,096–97 (1990) (statement of Rep. Madigan)).
25. H.R. REP. NO. 101-538, at 7 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1336, 1337.
26. Michele M. Bradley, The States’ Role in Regulating Food Labeling and Advertising: The
Effect of the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 649, 649
(1994) (citing FDA’s Continuing Failure To Regulate Health Claims for Foods: Hearings Before
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missive approach in allowing a broad range of health and nutrition
claims.27  Food companies took advantage of this by rebranding old
products and bombarding consumers with bold health claims.28  For
instance, food companies claimed margarine was so low in cholesterol
that it reduced the risk of heart disease.29
The NLEA amended the FDCA with six major changes.30  First, the
NLEA mandates that the FDA require and oversee nutrition labeling
for all food products.31  Second, the NLEA directs the FDA to estab-
lish definitions for certain commonly used nutrient-content
descriptors—such as “high” in dietary fiber, “low” in fat, and “lite”—
to provide consumers with reliable information by which to base their
purchases on.32  Third, the NLEA requires the FDA to review labels
claiming disease prevention.33  Fourth, the NLEA established require-
ments for packaged food labels, providing for the listing of additional
ingredients, mandatory components of standardized food, certified
color additives, and the percent of fruit or vegetable juice.34  Fifth, the
NLEA adds a clause to the FDCA that expressly preempts some state
law pertaining to certain labeling aspects.35  And sixth, the NLEA al-
lows for cooperative enforcement between the FDA and state govern-
ments by granting state governments a right to bring actions enforcing
the FDCA in federal courts, subject to certain limitations.36
A notable aspect of the FDCA is that it does not provide a private
right of action to enforce it.37  Thus, to obtain the right to sue and
obtain remedies for deceptive food labeling, private plaintiffs must in-
voke a state consumer-protection statute.
the Human Res. & Intergovernmental Relations Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Governmen-
tal Operations, 101st Cong. 30 (1989)).
27. Id. at 652.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Tamara Schulman, Note, Menu Labeling: Knowledge for a Healthier America, 47 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 587, 592 (2010).
31. Id. (citing NLEA § 2, sec. 403(q)(1), 104 Stat. 2353 (1990) (codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 343(q)(1))).
32. Id. (citing NLEA § 3(b)(1)(A)(iii), 104 Stat. at 2361 (codified at note following 21 U.S.C.
§ 343)).
33. Id. (citing NLEA § 3, sec. 403(r)(3)(B)(ii), 104 Stat. at 2359 (codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 343(r)(3)(B)(ii))).
34. Id. (citing NLEA § 7, sec. 403(i), 104 Stat. at 2364 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§ 343(i))).
35. Id. (citing NLEA § 6, sec. 403A, 104 Stat. at 2362–63 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§ 343-1)).
36. Schulman, supra note 30, at 592 (citing NLEA § 4, sec. 307, 104 Stat. at 2362 (codified at
21 U.S.C. § 337)).
37. See 21 U.S.C. § 337(a) (“[A]ll such proceedings for the enforcement, or to restrain viola-
tions, of this chapter shall be by and in the name of the United States.”).
2015] MISLEADING FOOD LABELING 1123
B. State Consumer-Protection Statutes
Every state has a consumer-protection statute, or set of statutes,
that contains broad prohibitions similar to those of the Federal Trade
Commission Act (FTC Act), which prohibits “unlawful,” “unfair,” or
“deceptive” business acts or practices.38  Most of these “little FCT
Acts” provide consumers with a private right of action for violations
of these prohibitions.39
California has particularly broad consumer-protection laws, which
are provided in its Unfair Competition Law (UCL),40 False Advertis-
ing Law (FAL),41 and Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA).42  The
UCL prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or
practice.”43  It also prohibits “unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading
advertising and any act prohibited by Chapter 1 (commencing with
Section 17500) of Part 3 of Division 7 of the Business and Professions
Code.”44  Thus, the UCL prohibitions incorporate all of the prohibi-
tions of the FAL, which makes it unlawful for a business to make any
statement that is “untrue or misleading” and that is “known, or which
by the exercise of reasonable care should be known, to be untrue or
misleading.”45  The CLRA lists certain “unfair methods of competi-
tion and unfair or deceptive acts or practices” and declares them un-
lawful.46  The UCL, FAL, and CLRA are all used in consumer suits
for deceptive food labeling.47  Importantly, they provide consumers
with private rights of action to obtain remedy under them.48
California’s UCL is arguably the broadest of all the state consumer-
protection statutes.49  It prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent
business act or practice,” while many other states’ consumer-protec-
38. Kathleen S. Morris, Expanding Local Enforcement of State and Federal Consumer Protec-
tion Laws, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1903, 1903, 1909, 1910 (2013); see also id. at 1928–49 (survey-
ing the consumer-protection acts in each state).
39. Id. at 1911 n.37, 1928–49.
40. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200–17210 (West 2012).
41. Id. §§ 17500–17509.
42. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1750–1785 (West 2012).
43. BUS. & PROF. § 17200.
44. Id.
45. See id. §§ 17200, 17500.
46. CIV. § 1770.
47. Anscombe & Buckley, supra note 2.
48. BUS. & PROF. § 17204 (allowing suits by “any person who has suffered injury in fact and
has lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition”); id. § 17535 (allowing suits by
“any person who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of a
violation of [the FAL]”); CIV. § 1780(a) (allowing suits by “[a]ny consumer who suffers any
damage as a result of the use or employment by any person of a method, act, or practice de-
clared to be unlawful by [the CLRA]”).
49. Morris, supra note 38, at 1905 n.3.
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tion statutes have more specific “laundry lists” of prohibited acts or
practices.50
The “unlawful” prong of the UCL makes violations of other laws
independently actionable.51  Under the unlawful prong of the UCL,
plaintiffs can bring claims based on violations of California’s Health
and Safety Code.52  The Health and Safety Code, in turn, incorporates
by reference the FDCA and the regulations promulgated under it.53
As for consumer claims under the “unfair” prong, California appel-
late courts are split and have been using three different definitions for
what constitutes an “unfair” business act or practice.54  The first test
requires the court to “weigh the utility of the defendant’s conduct
against the gravity of the harm to the alleged victim.”55  The second
test defines an unfair business act or practice as one that is “forbidden
by any law, be it civil or criminal, federal, state, or municipal, statu-
tory, regulatory, or court-made”56 or that “offends an established pub-
lic policy or . . . is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or
substantially injurious to consumers.”57  The third test adopts the ele-
ments that define unfairness under section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act: “(1) the consumer injury must be substantial; (2) the
injury must not be outweighed by any countervailing benefits to con-
50. Id. (quoting BUS. & PROF. § 17200).  Illinois’ Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices
Act, for example, prohibits a slightly more limited scope of acts and practices:
Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices, including but
not limited to the use or employment of any deception, fraud, false pretense, false
promise, misrepresentation or the concealment, suppression or omission of any mate-
rial fact, with intent that others rely upon the concealment, suppression or omission of
such material fact, or the use or employment of any practice described in Section 2 of
the “Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act”, approved August 5, 1965, in the conduct
of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful . . .
See 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2.
51. Aryeh v. Canon Bus. Solutions, Inc., 292 P.3d 871, 878 (Cal. 2013).
52. In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases, 175 P.3d 1170, 1174 (Cal. 2008).
53. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 110100(a) (West 2012) (incorporating “[a]ll food label-
ing regulations and any amendments to those regulations adopted pursuant to the [FDCA]” as
“the food labeling regulations of this state”).
54. Alexander N. Cross, Comment, Federalizing “Unfair Business Practice Claims” Under
California’s Unfair Competition Law, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 489, 490 (citing Smith v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399 (Ct. App. 2001); Gregory v. Albertson’s, Inc., 128 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 389 (Ct. App. 2002); Camacho v. Auto. Club S. Cal., 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770 (Ct. App.
2006)).
55. E.g., Smith, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 415.
56. E.g., Gregory, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 394 (quoting Saunders v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. Rptr.
2d 438, 441 (Ct. App. 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
57. E.g., id. (alteration in original) (quoting Podolsky v. First Healthcare Corp., 58 Cal. Rptr.
2d 89, 98 (Ct. App. 1996)).
2015] MISLEADING FOOD LABELING 1125
sumers or competition; and (3) it must be an injury that consumers
themselves could not reasonably have avoided.”58
Under the “fraudulent” prong, a plaintiff must show that “members
of the public are likely to be deceived,”59  A plaintiff must also allege
“that the defendant’s misrepresentations were an immediate cause of
the injury-causing conduct,” but the plaintiff need not allege “that
those misrepresentations were the sole or even the decisive cause of
the injury-producing conduct.”60
Thus, a consumer can use the “unlawful” prong of the UCL to sue
for a specific violation of the FDCA requirements by alleging a viola-
tion of the identical requirements in the California Health and Safety
Code.61  Alternatively, when the food label at hand has complied with
the specific requirements of the FDCA, a consumer can use the “un-
fair” and “fraudulent” prongs to bring claims that the food label is
otherwise unfair or deceptive.62
California courts generally find a plaintiff’s allegations that she ei-
ther “purchased, purchased more of[,] or paid more for” the defen-
dant’s product as a result of the defendant’s conduct to be sufficient to
establish Article III standing to state a claim under the California con-
sumer-protection statutes.63
C. Pleading a Deceptive Food Labeling Claim Under California
Law: Williams v. Gerber Products Co.
Williams v. Gerber Products Co.64 established an application of the
plausibility pleading standard of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly65 that
is permissive to plaintiffs bringing deceptive labeling claims under
California consumer-protection laws.66
Williams involved a class action challenge to the labeling of
Gerber’s “Fruit Juice Snacks,” part of the “Graduates for Toddlers”
58. E.g., Camacho, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 777 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 45(n)).
59. In re Tobacco II Cases, 207 P.3d 20, 29 (Cal. 2009) (quoting Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d
243, 250 (Cal. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
60. Id. at 40.
61. In re Farm Raised Salmon, 175 P.3d at 1175.
62. See, e.g., Second Amended Complaint for Violations of: Unfair Competition Law; False
Advertising Law; & Consumer Legal Remedies Act at paras. 167–68, Red v. Kraft Foods, Inc.,
754 F. Supp. 2d 1137 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (No. CV 10–1028–GW(AGRx)), 2010 WL 4771437.
63. Red, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1145; see also Von Koenig v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 713 F. Supp.
2d 1066, 1078–79 (E.D. Cal. 2010); Chacanaca v. Quaker Oats Co., 752 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1124–26
(N.D. Cal. 2010).
64. 552 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2008).
65. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
66. Williams, 552 F.3d at 938–39.
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food products line.67  The plaintiffs sued under California’s UCL,
FAL, and CLRA, alleging deceptive labeling.68  The plaintiffs chal-
lenged several features of the product’s packaging.69  First, the words
“fruit juice” were juxtaposed alongside images of fruits, including or-
anges, peaches, strawberries, and cherries.70  The plaintiffs argued that
this was deceptive because the product contained only white grape
juice from concentrate and no juice from the fruits depicted.71  Next, a
statement on the side panel of the package said that the product was
made “with real fruit juice and other all natural ingredients,” while
the two most prominent ingredients were corn syrup and sugar.72  An-
other statement on the side panel declared the product to be “one of a
variety of nutritious Gerber Graduates foods and juices.”73  The plain-
tiffs objected to the use of the word “nutritious” to describe the sug-
ary product.74  Finally, the product was labeled as a “snack,” while the
plaintiffs contended that it should be labeled a “candy,” “sweet,” or
“treat,” and that the words “‘naturally flavored’ allegedly did not
comply with the applicable text size requirements.”75
The district court granted Gerber’s motion to dismiss, finding that
Gerber’s statements were “not likely to deceive a reasonable con-
sumer as a matter of law.”76  The decision was supported by the fact
that the ingredients were listed on the side of the box and the finding
that the product’s “nutritious” claim was nonactionable puffery.77
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the plain-
tiffs’ claims.78  The court applied the “reasonable consumer test” as
the substantive standard governing the claims under the California
consumer-protection statutes used.79  Under the reasonable consumer
test, plaintiffs “must show that ‘members of the public are likely to be
deceived.’”80  The court also applied the procedural federal pleading
standard, which, under Twombly, requires that a plaintiff plead
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” and
67. Id. at 936.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Williams, 552 F.3d at 936.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 936, 938.
77. Id. at 937.
78. Williams, 552 F.3d at 940.
79. Id. at 938.
80. Id. (quoting Freeman v. Time, Inc., 68 F.3d 285, 289 (9th Cir. 1995)).
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that “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level.”81  However, the court then stated that
“California courts . . . have recognized that whether a business prac-
tice is deceptive will usually be a question of fact not appropriate for
decision on demurrer.”82
The court distinguished the facts of Williams from those of Freeman
v. Time, Inc.,83 a Ninth Circuit precedent, in which the court upheld
the dismissal of a claim challenging a mailer that allegedly suggested
that the plaintiff had won a million dollar sweepstakes.84  In Freeman,
the court found that it was impossible for the mailer to be misleading
because it explicitly stated multiple times that the plaintiff needed to
acquire a winning sweepstakes number in order to win.85  Because the
advertisement itself made it impossible for the plaintiff to prove that a
reasonable consumer would likely be deceived, it was not necessary
for the court to evaluate additional evidence.86
In Williams, however, the court held that the facts did not constitute
the rare situation in which it would be appropriate to grant a motion
to dismiss.87  It found that reasonable consumers could be misled by
the juxtaposition of “fruit juice” and images of fruit to believe that the
product contained juices from particular fruits that it did not actually
contain.88  It also found that the statement “made with fruit juice and
other all natural ingredients” could easily be interpreted by reasona-
ble consumers as a statement that all of the product’s ingredients were
natural, which was allegedly false.89  The court acknowledged that the
“nutritious” claim “could arguably constitute puffery,” which would
not be actionable in itself because the term “nutritious” would be “dif-
ficult to measure concretely.”90  However, the court allowed that alle-
gation to stand, stating that it contributed to the predominant
deceptive message conveyed by the other label representations.91
81. Id. at 938 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545, 547 (2007)).
82. Id. at 938–39 (citing Linear Tech. Corp. v. Applied Materials, Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 221,
236 (Ct. App. 2007) (“Whether a practice is deceptive, fraudulent, or unfair is generally a ques-
tion of fact which requires ‘consideration and weighing of evidence from both sides’ and which
usually cannot be made on demurrer.”)).
83. 68 F.3d 285.
84. Williams, 552 F.3d at 939; Freeman, 68 F.3d at 285.
85. Williams, 552 F.3d at 939.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 939 n.3.
91. Williams, 552 F.3d at 939 n.3.
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The court rejected the district court’s approach of looking at the
package as a whole when applying the reasonable consumer test.92  It
held that reasonable consumers should not be expected to “look be-
yond misleading representations on the front of the box to discover
the truth from the ingredient list in small print on the side of the
box.”93  The court also stated that the FDA-regulated ingredient list is
not intended to serve as a shield from liability for manufacturers who
make misleading statements elsewhere on the package.94  The court
therefore held that the plaintiffs stated a plausible deceptive labeling
claim.95
Williams demonstrates that it is difficult to get a deceptive labeling
suit dismissed on the ground that it is not plausible that the labeling at
issue is likely to mislead a reasonable consumer.  However, express
preemption has emerged as an alternative avenue by which a defen-
dant food manufacturer might attempt to dismiss these suits.
D. Preemption
“Preemption is a doctrine of American constitutional law under
which state and local governments are deprived of their power to act
in a given area, whether or not the state or local law, rule or action is
in direct conflict with federal law.”96  The doctrine arises from the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, which grants
Congress the power to preempt state law.97  The Supremacy Clause
provides that the laws enacted by the U.S. legislature to carry out the
Constitution are the “supreme Law of the Land” that binds all state
courts, state laws “to the [c]ontrary notwithstanding.”98  Thus, Con-
gress is “empowered to pre[ ]empt state law by so stating in express
terms.”99  That is, Congress may include a preemption clause in a fed-
eral statute that “explicitly withdraw[s] specified powers from the
92. Id. at 939.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 940.
96. JAMES T. O’REILLY, FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW: LEGISLATION,
REGULATION AND LITIGATION § 1.1, at 1 (2006) (citing Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of
Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 771 (1994)).
97. THOMAS O. MCGARITY, THE PREEMPTION WAR: WHEN FEDERAL BUREAUCRACIES
TRUMP LOCAL JURIES 45–46 (2008).
98. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2).  The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
federal regulations can preempt state law just as federal statutes can.  Hillsborough Cnty. v.
Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) (collecting cases).
99. MCGARITY, supra note 97, at 46 (quoting Hillsborough Cnty., 471 U.S. at 713).
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states.”100  This type of preemption is accordingly known as “express
preemption.”101
The U.S. Supreme Court has also created “implied preemption” (or
“field preemption”), a “separate body of [preemption] . . . in which
courts divine congressional intent not by interpreting an express pre-
emption clause but by comparing the federal statute’s overall lan-
guage and purpose to the operative aspects of the applicable state
law.”102  Implied preemption occurs when a court finds that a federal
regulatory scheme is “so pervasive” it implies “that Congress left no
room for the States to supplement it,”103 or when the “federal inter-
est” in the particular field governed by a statute is “so dominant” that
federal law “will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on
the same subject.”104  Additionally, even in the absence of express or
implied preemption, “conflict preemption” occurs when state law “ac-
tually conflicts” with federal law.105  Such a conflict arises either when
compliance with both the state and federal law is “a physical impossi-
bility,” or when state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplish-
ment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.”106  The analysis in this Comment, however, focuses prima-
rily on express preemption.107
Because Congress’ power to preempt state law in a particular area
is “well established,” courts deciding preemption cases seek only to
determine whether Congress has in fact exercised its preemption
power.108  In deciding an issue of express preemption, a court must
ascertain what the text of the applicable preemption clause means.109
The Supreme Court has directed judges to apply a presumption
against preemption when determining the existence and scope of pre-
100. Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 226 (2000).
101. Id.
102. MCGARITY, supra note 97, at 46.
103. Nelson, supra note 100, at 227 (quoting English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990);
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
104. Id. (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230).
105. Id. at 228 (quoting English, 496 U.S. at 79).
106. Id. at 228 & n.14 (noting that courts typically cite to Florida Lime & Avocado Growers,
Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963), in articulating the “physical impossibility” prong of the
test, and Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941), in articulating the “obstacle” prong of the
test).
107. Implied preemption likely does not apply under the NLEA and FDCA. See infra notes
130–33 and accompanying text.
108. Gardbaum, supra note 96, at 767 (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res.
Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 203 (1983)).
109. Nelson, supra note 100, at 226–27.
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emption.110  This means that when dealing with “areas of traditional
state regulation,” the court is to “assume that a federal statute has not
supplanted state law unless Congress has made such intention ‘clear
and manifest.’”111  Thus, if there are two equally plausible readings of
a preemption clause, the court must choose the one that disfavors
preemption.112
In Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC,113 the Supreme Court ex-
amined a preemption clause in the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).114  Like that of the NLEA, the FIFRA
preemption clause prohibited state-imposed “requirements.”115  The
Court interpreted the term “requirement” to encompass not only state
statutes and regulations, but also common-law duties and judge-made
rules imposed on defendants facing possible liability under a state law
cause of action.116  The Court also specified that as long as a state law
claim imposes obligations that are parallel to the federal law, the state
is effecting identical requirements, and the claim will not be
preempted.117
In the food labeling class action context, express preemption is used
as an affirmative defense by which the defendant food manufacturer
attempts to dismiss the complaint.118  The food manufacturer argues
that imposing liability based on the plaintiff’s claim of deceptive label-
ing would impose labeling “requirements” that are different from or
additional to the requirements of the applicable provisions of the
FDCA or its implementing regulations.119  Such state action is ex-
pressly prohibited, as to certain FDCA provisions, by the preemption
clause of the NLEA.120
110. Id. at 227 (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996); Cipollone v. Liggett
Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516, 518 (1992) (plurality opinion)).
111. MCGARITY, supra note 97, at 46 (quoting Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431,
449 (2005)).
112. Bates, 544 U.S. at 449.  “[B]ecause the States are independent sovereigns in our federal
system, we have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of
action.” Id. (quoting Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485) (alteration in original).
113. 544 U.S. 431.
114. Id. at 434, 435–36.
115. The FIFRA preemption clause provided, “[States] shall not impose or continue in effect
any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under
this subchapter.” Id. at 436 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b)).
116. Id. at 443.
117. Id. at 447.
118. See, e.g., Samet v. Proctor & Gamble Co., No. 5:12–CV–01891 PSG, 2013 WL 3124647, at
*6 (N.D. Cal. June 18, 2013).
119. Id.
120. 21 U.S.C. § 343-1(a) (2012).
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The logic behind the affirmative defense is that by seeking to im-
pose liability on a food manufacturer for labeling its product in a cer-
tain manner, a plaintiff is effectively using the state consumer-
protection law to compel the food manufacturer to change a certain
aspect of its label.  This arguably forces the food manufacturer to com-
ply with a sort of “requirement” that is not contained in the FDCA or
the regulations promulgated under it by the FDA.
Before delving further into the way courts apply express preemp-
tion under the NLEA, it is necessary to take a closer look at the
NLEA’s preemption clause.
1. Section 343-1.  National Uniform Nutrition Labeling
In addition to providing federal standards for food labeling in § 343,
the NLEA added § 343-1, titled “National uniform nutrition label-
ing.”121  Subsection 343-1(a) contains a preemption clause with lan-
guage that expressly prohibits states from establishing certain
“requirements” for food labeling.122  It provides in relevant part:
(a) [N]o State . . . may directly or indirectly establish under any
authority or continue in effect as to any food in interstate com-
merce—
(1) any requirement for a food which is the subject of a stan-
dard of identity established under section 341 of this title that is
not identical to such standard of identity or that is not identical
to the requirement of section 343(g) of this title . . . ,
(2) any requirement for the labeling of food of the type re-
quired by section 343(c), 343(e), 343(i)(2), 343(w), or 343(x) of
this title that is not identical to the requirement of such section
. . . ,
(3) any requirement for the labeling of food of the type re-
quired by section 343(b), 343(d), 343(f), 343(h), 343(i)(1), or
343(k) of this title that is not identical to the requirement of
such section . . . ,
(4) any requirement for nutrition labeling of food that is not
identical to the requirement of section 343(q) of this title . . . ,
(5) any requirement respecting any claim of the type described
in section 343(r)(1) of this title, made in the label or labeling of
food that is not identical to the requirement of section 343(r) of
this title . . . .123
121. NLEA, Pub. L. No. 101-535, § 6, sec. 403A, 104 Stat. 2353, 2362–64 (1990) (codified at 21
U.S.C. § 343-1(a)).
122. 21 U.S.C. § 343-1(a).
123. Id.
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The enumerated subsections that are given preemptive effect are
various provisions of the “Misbranded food” section.  These provi-
sions include § 343(i)(2), which addresses ingredient listing;124
§ 343(k), which addresses the disclosure of artificial flavoring, color-
ing, and preservatives;125 § 343(q), which provides specifications for
the required nutrition-facts panel;126 and § 343(r), which imposes re-
quirements for and defines “nutrient content claims” and “health
claims” that might be contained on the label, typically on the front of
the product’s package.127  “Labeling” is defined as “all labels and
other written, printed, or graphic matter (1) upon any article or any of
its containers or wrappers, or (2) accompanying such article.”128  The
FDA has interpreted the phrase “not identical” to mean state require-
ments that impose obligations not found in the applicable federal stat-
utory provision or implementing regulation, or that differ from those
imposed by the applicable provision or regulation.129
The NLEA also contains an uncodified savings clause that limits the
general preemptive effect of the NLEA, declaring that the NLEA
“shall not be construed to preempt any provision of State law, unless
such provision is expressly preempted under [21 U.S.C. § 343-
1(a)].”130  Two provisions following the savings clause provide that the
NLEA also does not preempt any label statement that serves as a
“warning concerning the safety of the food or component of the
food,” and that it does not give preemptive effect to parts of the
FDCA not amended by § 343-1(a).131  Courts have relied on the sav-
ings clause, in part, to determine that state law regarding food labeling
is not impliedly preempted by the NLEA or FDCA, even though both
extensively regulate the field.132  Thus, the preemptive effect of the
federal labeling standards imposed by the FDCA is likely limited to
the scope of the § 343-1(a) express preemption clause.133
124. Id. §§ 343(i)(2), 343-1(a)(2).
125. Id. §§ 343(k), 343-1(a)(3).
126. Id. §§ 343(q), 343-1(a)(4).
127. Id. §§ 343(r), 343-1(a)(5).
128. 21 U.S.C. § 321(m).
129. 21 C.F.R. § 100.1(c)(4) (2014).
130. NLEA, Pub. L. No. 101-535, § 6(c)(1), sec. 403(A), 104 Stat. 2353, 2364 (1990).
131. Id. § 6(c)(2)–(3).
132. In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases, 175 P.3d 1170, 1179 (Cal. 2008).
133. Id.
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2. Types of Deceptive Food Labeling Claims Not Subject to NLEA
Preemption
Certain types of private deceptive food labeling claims have been
found to escape the preemptive power of § 343-1(a).  These include
(1) claims that implicate FDCA provisions not enumerated in § 343-
1(a);134 (2) claims that impose requirements identical to those of the
FDCA provisions enumerated in § 343-1(a);135 and (3) claims that in-
volve unregulated label features.136
It is important to note that § 343-1(a) does not apply to all of the
FDCA provisions governing food labeling.137  For example, the provi-
sion addressing the disclosure of the geographic location in which the
food was made is one of the provisions that are not enumerated in the
preemption clause.  So, a consumer suit based on a misleading repre-
sentation about a food’s origin would not be subject to express pre-
emption.138  Also among the provisions not included is § 343(a)(1),
which contains a general prohibition against misleading labeling,
deeming a food to be “misbranded” when its labeling “is false or mis-
leading in any particular.”139  The significance of this exclusion will be
discussed in more depth in Part III.A.140
Additionally, state law claims that impose requirements that are
identical to the requirements of the enumerated provisions are not
preempted under this clause.141  This arises when the plaintiff alleges
that a food label is deceptive because of some feature that is specifi-
cally in violation of a provision of the FDCA or its implementing reg-
ulations.142  This Comment focuses on cases in which the food label
complies with the applicable FDCA provisions but is nevertheless al-
leged to be misleading,143 as those are the cases in which the claims
are subject to preemption.
Other claims that avoid preemption are those that concern labeling
aspects that are unregulated, such as a statement that a product is
“natural.”  There have been several consumer suits containing claims
134. See infra notes 137–39 and accompanying text.
135. See infra notes 141–43 and accompanying text.
136. See infra notes 144–46 and accompanying text.
137. See 21 U.S.C. § 343-1(a) (2012).
138. See Chavez v. Blue Sky Natural Beverage Co., 340 F. App’x 359, 361–62 (9th Cir. 2009).
139. 21 U.S.C. § 343(a)(1).
140. See infra notes 179–213 and accompanying text.
141. See, e.g., Lilly v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 743 F.3d 662, 664–65 (9th Cir. 2014).
142. See id.; see also Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 442–44 (2005).
143. Because there is a separate provision, § 343(a)(1), that prohibits labeling that is “false or
misleading in any particular,” any labeling that is misleading is arguably in violation of the
FDCA unless the allegedly misleading feature is specifically required by it. See infra notes
179–213 and accompanying text.
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that the use of the term “natural” on a food label was misleading
when the food contained allegedly unnatural components, such as in-
gredients from genetically modified organisms or artificially manufac-
tured ingredients like high fructose corn syrup.144  Courts have found
these claims not to be preempted because they did not implicate any
of the provisions listed in the preemption clause.145  Similarly, decep-
tive labeling claims based on other unregulated statements, such as
“wholesome” and those based on front-of-the-label pictures, which
are generally not regulated under the FDCA, are not found to be ex-
pressly preempted.146
3. Deceptive Food Labeling Claims Barred Under the NLEA
Preemption Clause
As discussed above, whether or not the FDCA’s preemption clause
renders a deceptive labeling claim preempted depends on whether the
plaintiff is effectively seeking to impose a food labeling “requirement”
that is not contained in the FDCA.147  Preemption can apply in cases
where the plaintiff alleges that some feature or features of the label
make it misleading, even though the label complies with the FDCA
requirements regarding those specific features.  The following exam-
ples illustrate the different scenarios in which courts have held decep-
tive labeling claims to be preempted.
In some cases, the plaintiff takes issue with a statement on a food
label that is technically true and is not itself violative of the FDCA,
but that is allegedly misleading because of other facts that are not
disclosed on the label.  In Turek v. General Mills, Inc.,148 the maker of
a “chewy bar” product touted its fiber content by calling it “Fiber
Plus” and including a circled statement on the front of its label: “35%
of your daily fiber.”149  The plaintiff alleged not that this information
was false, but that it was misleading because of the manufacturer’s
failure to disclose to consumers certain information about the type of
fiber the product contained.150  According to the plaintiff, the product
principally contained a type of extracted and processed fiber called
144. See, e.g., Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., No. CV 11-05379 MMM (AGRx), 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 154750, at *13–16 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2011) (order granting the defendant’s motion
to dismiss); Lockwood v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1031 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
145. Id.
146. See, e.g., Chacanaca v. Quaker Oats Co., 752 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1123–24 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
147. See supra notes 121–23 and accompanying text.
148. 662 F.3d 423 (7th Cir. 2011).
149. Id. at 425.
150. Id. at 425–26.
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“inulin” fiber.151  Inulin fiber, allegedly, does not provide the full ben-
efits that naturally occurring fiber has come to be known for—namely,
promoting regular bowel movements, lowering cholesterol, and help-
ing avoid weight gain.152  The plaintiff further alleged that inulin fiber
causes stomach problems in some people and is harmful to women
who are pregnant or breast feeding.153
The Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff’s claim, brought under
Illinois consumer-protection statutes, was preempted by the FDCA.154
First, the court examined the FDCA provisions covered by the pre-
emption clause that address information about fiber and the one pro-
vision that mentions inulin.155  It found that because the FDCA does
not require disclosures about the particular type of fiber that a prod-
uct contains, the plaintiff was attempting to impose requirements that
are not identical to those of the FDCA.156  Writing for the court,
Judge Richard Posner stated: “Even if the disclaimers . . . would be
consistent with the requirements imposed by the [FDCA], consistency
is not the test; identity is.  Maybe such disclaimers would be a good
thing . . . and the FDA should require them, but that is irrelevant to
this appeal.”157
There are also cases in which the labeling feature at issue is specifi-
cally allowed by FDA regulations, but the plaintiff alleges that it is
misleading in context. Samet v. Proctor & Gamble Co.158 is such a
case.  In Samet, the plaintiff claimed that the product labeling for a
“Fruity Snack” was misleading because it displayed pictures of
strawberries, blueberries, and raspberries next to the statement “made
with real fruit.”159  The plaintiff alleged that this implied that the
product contained all of the pictured fruits.160  The only fruit ingredi-
ent in the product was apple puree concentrate.161  An FDA regula-
tion promulgated under § 343(k), which pertains to artificially
flavored foods, expressly allows the use of words or vignettes (includ-
ing depictions of the fruit) to characterize the product’s flavor, even if
none of the depicted fruits are contained in the product and no flavor
is derived from those fruits, as long as it contains the phrase “artifi-
151. Id.
152. Id. at 426.
153. Id.
154. Turek, 662 F.3d at 424, 427.
155. Id. at 426–27.
156. Id. at 427.
157. Id.
158. No. 5:12–CV–01891 PSG, 2013 WL 3124647 (N.D. Cal. June 18, 2013).
159. Id. at *6.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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cially flavored.”162  Because the label contained the statement “artifi-
cially flavored,” the court found the claim to be preempted under
§ 343-1(a).163  The plaintiff argued that the label was nonetheless mis-
leading because of the inclusion of the phrase “made with real
fruit.”164  The court held that allowing the claim to proceed based on
the “made with real fruit” statement would impose a requirement that
“goes beyond what is required in the FDCA,” and that this kind of
claim is expressly preempted.165
In yet another type of deceptive food labeling case, the alleged de-
ception stems from a label statement that was required by the FDCA,
but the food manufacturer went beyond what was required and made
that statement more prominent.  This scenario is represented by Car-
rea v. Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc.166  In Carrea, the plaintiff took
issue with a label statement that announced “0 grams trans fat” on the
front of the label of an ice cream product, alleging that it was mislead-
ing because the product actually did contain some trans fat, as indi-
cated by the fact that it contained partially hydrogenated oil, as well as
high overall levels of fat.167  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court’s finding that the claim was expressly preempted by the
NLEA.168  The applicable regulation required that if the product con-
tained less than 0.5 grams of trans fat per serving, the amount must be
rounded down and expressed as zero in the nutrition-facts panel.169
Another regulation expressly permitted the product to display the “0
grams trans fat” statement on the front as a nutrient content claim,
which the FDA suggests should be consistent with the information in
the nutrition-facts panel.170  Because this statement constituted a “nu-
trient content claim,” which is regulated under § 343(r), one of the
preemptive provisions in § 343-1(a), the claim was preempted because
it imposed a requirement “not identical” to the requirements for nu-
trient content claims under the NLEA.171
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Samet, 2013 WL 3124647, at *6.
165. Id.
166.  475 F. App’x 113 (9th Cir. 2012).
167. Id. at 115.
168. Id.
169. Id. (citing 21 C.F.R. § 101.9(c)(2)(ii) (2012)).
170. Id. (citing Food Labeling, 58 Fed. Reg. 44,020, 44,024–25 (Aug. 18, 1993)).
171. Id.
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III. ANALYSIS
In the example cases described above, the courts should not have
held the claims to be preempted by the NLEA.  The courts have ap-
plied the NLEA’s preemption clause too broadly, and, as a result,
have barred claims that challenge labeling conduct that is highly likely
to mislead consumers.  Courts have found consumer deceptive label-
ing claims preempted when the allegedly deceptive label features were
in compliance with the FDCA provisions that addressed those specific
features.172  However, this approach overlooks the fact that a decep-
tive labeling claim, at its core, is simply a means to impose a state
requirement not to be deceptive—a requirement “identical” to the
FDCA requirement not to be “false or misleading in any particu-
lar.”173  Courts should interpret the NLEA’s preemption clause more
narrowly, so as to mean that a state requirement that a food label
cannot be deceptive does not come within its preemptive scope, and,
thus, is not prohibited.  The result would be that more consumer de-
ceptive labeling claims would avoid preemption, allowing states a
greater, and much needed, hand in protecting consumers from decep-
tive food labeling.
This narrower interpretation of the NLEA’s preemption clause is
supported by the fact that the FDCA provides a catchall provision in
§ 343(a)(1), which requires that a food label cannot be “false or mis-
leading in any particular.”174  This catchall provision is properly inter-
preted as encompassing all the other, more specific requirements
contained in the FDCA; in other words, every food label feature is
subject to the requirement not to be misleading, whether or not it
complies with other FDCA requirements.175
The interpretation that the NLEA’s preemption clause does not
prohibit state requirements not to be deceptive is also supported by
the reasoning in Supreme Court cases, in which the Court has inter-
preted similar preemption language in analogous contexts, including
pesticide labeling and tobacco labeling.176  In these cases, the Court
employed tests for determining when a state law requirement is differ-
ent or additional to a federal requirement for the purposes of express
preemption.177  Under these tests, a state requirement not to be de-
172. See supra notes 147–71 and accompanying text.
173. 21 U.S.C. § 343(a)(1) (2012).
174. See infra notes 179–213 and accompanying text.
175. See infra notes 179–213 and accompanying text.
176. See infra notes 214–57 and accompanying text.
177. See infra notes 214–57 and accompanying text.
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ceptive would not come within the preemptive scope of the NLEA’s
preemption clause.178
A. Section 343(a)(1), the FDCA’s Catchall Provision
Prohibiting Misleading Labeling
Viewing the NLEA’s preemption clause in conjunction with the
misbranding provisions reveals that the provision that generally pro-
hibits misleading labeling is not included among the misbranding pro-
visions given preemptive effect in the preemption clause.179  Thus, it
can be interpreted that the NLEA was not intended to preempt state
law claims that may impose liability for a misleading label.
The precise meaning of the term “requirement” under the NLEA’s
preemption clause must be interpreted in light of its statutory con-
text.180  The NLEA was enacted in order to create uniform federal
food labeling standards and to educate and inform consumers.181  The
NLEA, in turn, amends the FDCA, the purpose of which is “to pre-
vent the adulteration, misbranding, and false advertising of food . . .
for the purposes of safeguarding the public health [and] preventing
deceit upon the purchasing public.”182  The preemption clause prohib-
its states from establishing “requirements” that are “of the type” of
those provided in the applicable provisions of the “Misbranded food”
section of the FDCA, but that are “not identical to” those require-
ments.183  The “Misbranded food” section declares that “[a] food shall
be deemed misbranded [if] . . .” and then lists labeling conduct that
renders a food misbranded, provided in different subsections catego-
rized by the type of labeling feature.184  Some of these sections give
mandatory label requirements, such as the requirements concerning
the nutrition-facts panel,185 and others give requirements that are only
required as conditions of some voluntary addition to the label, such as
nutrient content claims on the front of the package.186  Another exam-
ple is subsection (k), titled “Artificial flavoring, artificial coloring, or
chemical preservatives.”  It provides that a food shall be deemed mis-
178. See infra notes 214–57 and accompanying text.
179. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 343(a)(1), 343-1(a) (2012).
180. See generally YULE KIM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-989, REPORT FOR CONGRESS,
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS (2008), available at
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf.
181. See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text.
182. H.R. REP. NO. 75-2139, at 1 (1938).
183. 21 U.S.C. § 343-1(a) (2012).
184. Id. § 343.
185. See id. § 343(q).
186. See id. § 343(r).
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branded if “it bears or contains any artificial flavoring, artificial color-
ing, or chemical preservative, unless it bears labeling stating that fact,
except that to the extent that compliance with the requirements of this
paragraph is impracticable, exemptions shall be established by regula-
tions promulgated by the Secretary [of Health and Human Ser-
vices].”187  The implementing regulations promulgated by the
Secretary provide more detailed lists of prohibitions, conditions, and
allowances.188  Thus, the term “requirements” can be understood to
mean the conditions that the food manufacturer must comply with in
order to avoid its food product being deemed misbranded.
Subsection (a) of the “Misbranded food” section is titled “False or
misleading label”; it reads: “A food shall be deemed misbranded [if]
its labeling is false or misleading in any particular.”189  It does not
provide specific requirements for a label to meet in order to avoid
being misleading; it is a simple prohibition of false or misleading label-
ing.190  This suggests that under the FDCA, a food manufacturer can-
not avoid its product from being deemed misbranded just by
complying with the requirements relating to specific labeling features.
It must also ensure that the label is not “misleading in any
particular.”191
Notably, this subsection is not included among those enumerated in
the preemption clause and, therefore, it was not given preemptive ef-
fect by the drafters.192  This indicates that states are not expressly pre-
empted from making laws that provide rules for when a food label is
misleading in some way.  This is already evident from the fact that
courts have found deceptive labeling claims involving unregulated
terms not to be preempted because none of the misbranding provi-
sions given preemptive effect were being implicated.193  However,
even when consumer deceptive labeling suits implicate the preemptive
provisions, they are not necessarily imposing different or additional
requirements.  The fact that not being misleading is, in itself, a sepa-
rate requirement for a label to avoid being deemed misbranded means
that all the specific conditions provided under the preemptive provi-
187. Id. §§ 343(k), 321(d).
188. E.g., 21 C.F.R. § 101.22(i) (2014).
189. 21 U.S.C. § 343(a)(1).
190. See id.
191. Id.
192. See id. § 343-1(a).
193. See supra notes 144–46 and accompanying text.
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sions carry with them the more general “requirement” that the label
cannot be misleading in any way.194
For example, the regulations promulgated under the “artificial fla-
voring” section, given preemptive effect, specifically allow a manufac-
turer of fruit juice to use depictions (or vignettes) of fruit that is not
contained in the product to indicate its flavor, as long as it also in-
cludes that the product is “artificially flavored.”195  As a defendant,
the food manufacturer would argue that a deceptive labeling claim
could not be used to impose liability for this conduct because doing so
would establish a requirement different than those of the regulation’s
artificial flavoring provision.  However, this argument would be
flawed when reading the preemptive provision in context.  This is be-
cause the food manufacturer is only allowed to use vignettes of fruit if
it does not make the label “misleading in any particular.”196  Thus, the
consumer suit attempts only to enforce a nonpreempted or identical
requirement and would not be preempted under Bates.197
Action by the FDA has been consistent with this interpretation of
§ 343(a)(1).  A 2009 enforcement letter to Nestle´ USA (Nestle´) is an
example of the FDA’s acknowledgement that a label that complies
with other specific requirements can still be misleading under
§ 343(a)(1).198  The FDA warned Nestle´ that the labeling on its Juicy
Juice products was misleading, in violation of § 343(a)(1).199  The
products were labeled “All Natural 100% Juice Orange Tangerine”
and “All Natural 100% Juice Grape” and featured vignettes of or-
anges and grapes, but orange and tangerine juice and grape juice were
not the predominant juices in the products.200  The labels also con-
194. The definition of “misleading” given in the FDCA supports this interpretation, as it ac-
knowledges that misleading labeling can arise from a combination of multiple representations
and omissions and encompass several different label features.  21 U.S.C. § 321(n).  The general
definitions section provides:
If an article is alleged to be misbranded because the labeling or advertising is mislead-
ing, then in determining whether the labeling or advertising is misleading there shall be
taken into account (among other things) not only representations made or suggested by
statement, word, design, device, or any combination thereof, but also the extent to
which the labeling or advertising fails to reveal facts material in the light of such repre-
sentations . . . .
Id. (emphasis added).
195. 21 C.F.R. § 101.22(i) (2014).
196. 21 U.S.C. § 343(a)(1).
197. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005).
198. Letter from Roberta F. Wagner, Dir., Office of Compliance, Ctr. for Food Safety & Ap-
plied Nutrition, FDA, to Brad Alford, Chairman & CEO, Nestle U.S.A. (Dec. 4, 2009) [hereinaf-
ter Letter from Roberta F. Wagner], available at http://www.fda.gov/iceci/enforcementactions/
warningletters/2009/ucm194122.htm.
199. Id. ¶ 2.
200. Id. ¶ 4.
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tained the disclaimer: “Flavored juice blend from concentrate with
other natural flavors & added ingredients.”201  The labels were in
compliance with the FDA regulations addressing juice name and fla-
vor labeling, which specifically allow a juice blend to be named by a
juice that is not the predominant juice in the blend if the label also
indicates that the named juice refers to the flavor.202  A label is also
expressly allowed to use vignettes to indicate the flavor of a juice.203
Nevertheless, the FDA concluded that the use of the words “All Natu-
ral 100% Juice” in close proximity to “Orange Tangerine” and
“Grape” could lead consumers to believe that these products con-
sisted of 100% orange tangerine and grape juice.204  The use of the
vignettes and the reduced visibility of the disclaimer also contributed
to this potential deception.205
The misleading labeling described in the letter is very similar to the
alleged deception in Samet.206  The Samet court barred a deceptive
labeling claim based on the combination of pictures of certain fruit
and the statement “made with real fruit,” when the product contained
none of the depicted fruits.207  However, the FDA found a similar de-
sign to be misleading under § 343(a)(1) despite the fact that the label-
ing at issue was expressly allowed.208
Also supporting the interpretation that § 343(a)(1) effectively en-
compasses all the other, more specific requirements for food labeling
is the argument that the drafters of the preemption clause likely did
not have consumer-protection suits in mind.  The use of state con-
sumer-protection suits to challenge deceptive labeling practices is a
relatively recent phenomenon.209  Because such suits were rare when
the NLEA was enacted, the drafters likely had in mind state statutes,
regulations, or policies that specifically addressed food labeling.  De-
ceptive labeling claims brought under consumer-protection statutes
can be distinguished from state statutes or regulations that specifically
201. Id.
202. 21 C.F.R. § 102.33(d)(1) (2015).
203. Id. § 101.22(i).
204. Letter from Roberta F. Wagner, supra note 198, ¶ 4.
205. Id.
206. See supra notes 158–65 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 158–65 and accompanying text.
208. Letter from Roberta F. Wagner, supra note 198, ¶ 4.
209. See NICOLE E. NEGOWETTI, BROOKINGS INST., FOOD LABELING LITIGATION: EXPOSING
GAPS IN THE FDA’S RESOURCES AND REGULATORY AUTHORITY 1 (2014) (noting that “the
number of [food labeling] consumer protection class actions brought in federal court climbed
from 19 cases in 2008 to more than 102 in 2012”), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/
research/files/papers/2014/06/26%20food%20labeling%20litigation/negowetti_food%20labeling
%20litigation.pdf.
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set out different or additional food labeling requirements.  Consumer-
protection suits will only be successful if the plaintiff can show that the
labeling is likely to deceive a reasonable consumer, and can thus be
seen as enforcing the nonpreempted requirement that a label cannot
be “misleading in any particular.”210  On the other hand, if states were
to make their own statutes and regulations creating specific require-
ments for food labeling that are different from or additional to the
federal requirements, liability could be imposed on a food manufac-
turer simply based on a violation of those laws, regardless of whether
or not it has the potential to actually mislead the reasonable
consumer.
Of course, food manufacturers can assert a different interpretation
of how the general prohibition of misleading labeling fits into the stat-
utory structure.  They could argue that when the FDCA or imple-
menting regulations provide conditions for a label to avoid being
deemed misbranded or specifically allow certain labeling conduct, the
legislature and FDA have determined that compliance with those con-
ditions is enough to prevent the label from being misleading.  In prac-
tical effect, compliance with the federal requirements does not come
close to guaranteeing that a food label will not be misleading.211
However, even if this alternate interpretation is an equally reasonable
one, the presumption against preemption dictates that courts are to
choose the interpretation that “disfavors preemption.”212  The inter-
pretation that § 343(a)(1) provides a requirement that a label must
not be misleading in any way, which serves as an overarching condi-
tion to all the more specific requirements about particular labeling
features, should win out.
In other words, not to be misleading is always a requirement for
food labels, regardless of the other requirements that may apply to the
particular label features at hand.213  Consumer actions to enforce this
requirement, which is not covered by the preemption clause, should
not be subject to express preemption.
210. 21 U.S.C. § 343(a)(1) (2012).
211. See supra notes 147–71, infra notes 271–97, and accompanying text.
212. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005).
213. See POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228 (2014). POM Wonderful
involved a claim brought under the Landham Act for the deceptive labeling of fruit juice as
“pomegranate blueberry” when it contained only 0.3% pomegranate juice and 0.2% blueberry
juice. Id. at 2233.  The Supreme Court held that the claim was not precluded by the fact that the
juice label complied with the FDCA requirements applicable to fruit juice labeling. Id. at
2236–41.  Although POM Wonderful does not apply to the issue of preemption, as it involved
two federal statutes, id. at 2236, it does acknowledge that a label feature can be deceptive even if
it complies with the FDCA provisions applicable to that particular feature.
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B. Supreme Court Interpretations of Similar Preemption Clauses
The above conception of the state requirements that consumer de-
ceptive labeling claims impose comports with the reasoning of Su-
preme Court cases interpreting preemption clauses similar to the
NLEA’s preemption clause.
1. “Requirements” Under Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC
The Bates decision involved an express preemption clause worded
similarly to that of § 343-1(a).  The Bates court interpreted § 136v(b)
of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),
which provided that, for pesticides, “[states] shall not impose or con-
tinue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition
to or different from those required under this subchapter.”214  For
comparison, § 343-1(a) of the NLEA prohibits states from establish-
ing “any requirement” for a food or food labeling that is “not identical
to” the requirements of certain subsections of the misbranding sec-
tion.215  The Bates court established that state common-law duties and
judge-made rules can constitute “requirements” for the purpose of ex-
press preemption.216  However, it admitted that “requirements” may
not always carry that meaning within a preemption clause.217  The
court also specified that
[a] requirement is a rule of law that must be obeyed; an event, such
as a jury verdict, that merely motivates an optional decision is not a
requirement. The proper inquiry calls for an examination of the ele-
ments of the common-law duty at issue, not for speculation as to
whether a jury verdict will prompt the manufacturer to take any
particular action.218
The court went on to explain how to determine whether a common-
law duty is preempted by a provision prohibiting state requirements
that are “in addition to or different from” federal requirements.219
The proper analysis requires looking at the common-law duty on
which the state law claim is predicated and comparing it to the duties
imposed by the federal statute.220  The state common-law claim will be
preempted as imposing a “different or additional” requirement only
when the common-law duty imposes a broader obligation than the du-
214. Id. at 439, 441–42 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 136v (2004)).
215. 21 U.S.C. § 343-1(a).
216. Bates, 544 U.S. at 443.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 445.
219. Id. at 444.
220. Id. at 445.
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ties imposed by the federal standards.221  This analysis comes from an
earlier Supreme Court plurality decision in Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc.222  In Cipollone, the Court compared general duties im-
posed on cigarette advertisers by various tort claims with the duties
imposed by the standards in the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Ad-
vertising Act.223  While the Bates court found that the plaintiff’s fraud
and failure-to-warn claims may impose a labeling requirement subject
to preemption by FIFRA’s preemption clause, it did not apply the
Cipollone analysis.224  It framed the question of preemption as
whether the duty imposed by the state failure-to-warn and fraud torts
imposed a broader obligation than FIFRA’s labeling requirements,
which prohibited misleading labeling.225  It then remanded the matter
to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.226
Because the Bates court declined to analyze whether the require-
ment would actually be different or additional to the requirements in
FIFRA, it leaves some uncertainty as to how to make such a determi-
nation.  However, following the analysis proposed in Bates and
demonstrated in Cipollone, it appears that the common-law duty im-
posed by a deceptive labeling claim establishes an obligation that is
narrower, not broader, than the obligations established in the mis-
branding provisions of the FDCA.
The FDCA prohibits the introduction of “misbranded” food into
interstate commerce.227  One of the ways a food can be deemed mis-
branded is if “its labeling is false or misleading in any particular.”228
In determining whether the labeling is false or misleading, “there shall
be taken into account (among other things) not only representations
made or suggested by statement, word, design, device, or any combi-
nation thereof, but also the extent to which the labeling or advertising
fails to reveal facts material in the light of such representations.”229
Under the California consumer-protection statutes, to state a claim
for a deceptive or misleading business practice, the plaintiff must show
that “reasonable consumers” are “likely to be deceived.”230  Both the
state duty and federal duty are conduct based and do not require that
221. Id. at 453.
222. 505 U.S. 504, 521 (1992) (plurality opinion).
223. Id. at 525–30.
224. Bates, 544 U.S. at 453.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) (2012).
228. Id. § 343(a)(1).
229. Id. § 321(n).
230. Williams v. Gerber Prods. Co., 552 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2008).
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the food manufacturer intended to mislead anyone.231  However, the
meaning of “misleading” under the FDCA has been interpreted to be
based on the effect of the label on “the ignorant, the unthinking[,] and
the credulous” consumer, rather than a reasonable consumer, as
under California law.232  This interpretation was guided by the reme-
dial purpose of the FDCA, which calls for a broad interpretation of
“misleading” that extends beyond experienced consumers to the pub-
lic as a whole.233  Under this interpretation, the federal statute ap-
pears to impose a duty not to mislead that covers a broader class of
people than does California law, which is based on what would likely
deceive a reasonable consumer.234  Also, the FDCA’s list of the label-
ing aspects to be considered when making a finding that a label is
misleading does not expressly limit the factors that might make a label
misleading, but leaves it open-ended with the phrase “among other
things.”235  Thus, under the Bates-Cipollone analysis, it appears that
the duty imposed by California consumer-protection law is at least
equivalent to, if not narrower than, the duties imposed by the FDCA
misbranding requirements.236
Because California’s narrower obligation not to mislead fits within
the FDCA’s broader obligation not to mislead, consumer suits that
challenge misleading labeling only impose state requirements
equivalent the federal requirements.237  Therefore, such consumer
suits should not be found preempted.
While California’s duty not to mislead is narrower than the federal
duty in terms of the extent of the obligation imposed, it is broader in
terms of the subject matter encompasses.  For this reason, it can be
argued that it falls outside the scope of the NLEA’s preemptive effect,
which is limited to the text of its preemption clause.238
231. United States v. An Article of Food . . . “Manischewitz . . . Diet Thins,” 377 F. Supp. 746,
749 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (finding that for a food to be misbranded as misleading “[i]t is not neces-
sary to show that anyone was actually misled or deceived, or that there was any intent to
deceive”); accord United States v. Strauss, 999 F.2d 692, 697 (2d Cir. 1993).
232. Strauss, 999 F.2d at 696 (quoting United States v. An Article . . . Consisting of 216 Indi-
vidually Cartoned Bottles, More or Less, of an Article Labeled in Part: Sudden Change (Sudden
Change), 409 F.2d 734, 740 (2d Cir. 1969)).
233. See Sudden Change, 409 F.2d at 740 n.8.
234. Williams, 552 F.3d at 938.
235. 21 U.S.C. § 321(n) (2012).
236. Because the California’s consumer-protection laws are the most expansive consumer-
protection laws, the outcome for other states’ consumer-protection laws will likely be the same,
as the duties they impose would be even narrower in comparison with the federally imposed
duty. See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text.
237. See Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 445, 453 (2005).
238. See infra notes 239–57 and accompanying text.
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2. Type of “Requirements” Under Altria Group, Inc. v. Good
Altria Group, Inc. v. Good,239 a 2008 Supreme Court case that also
drew from Cipollone, provides another source of guidance for assess-
ing the scope of the NLEA’s express preemption clause.  Like Cipol-
lone, Altria involved the express preemption clause of the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA).240  The plaintiff
brought a claim under the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act, alleging
that a cigarette manufacturer fraudulently conveyed through adver-
tisement that its “light” cigarettes delivered less tar and nicotine than
other brands to consumers, while knowing that the message was un-
true.241  The express preemption clause of the FCLAA stated that
“[n]o requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall
be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promo-
tion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity
with the provisions of this chapter.”242
In an opinion by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held 5–4 that
the fraud claim was not preempted under the FCLAA’s preemption
clause.243  It held that the language “based on smoking and health”
narrows the scope of the preemption clause such that it does not en-
compass the “more general duty not to make fraudulent state-
ments.”244  The Court distinguished the language “based on” as being
narrower than language like “related to” because it requires a rela-
tively direct connection between “requirements and prohibitions” and
“smoking and health.”245  The Court reasoned that although the plain-
tiffs’ alleged harm from the fraudulent ad was related to smoking and
health, the preemption clause only prohibits “requirements or
prohibitions” that are “based on smoking and health.”246  Because the
Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act did not mention smoking or health,
it did not impose “requirements or prohibitions” that were “based on
smoking or health.”247  Instead, it imposed a more general rule that
established a duty not to deceive—a duty which was not “based on
smoking and health.”248  The Court also noted that fraud claims do
not conflict with the Act’s stated purpose of protecting the national
239. 555 U.S. 70 (2008).
240. Id. at 73.
241. Id. at 72–73.
242. Id. at 78–79 (alteration in original) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2008)).
243. Id. at 87.
244. Id.
245. Altria, 555 U.S. at 84–86.
246. Id. at 84.
247. Id. at 80–81.
248. Id. at 87.
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economy from nonuniform cigarette labeling and advertising regula-
tions pertaining to smoking and health.249  Fraud claims, whether chal-
lenging statements that are inherently false or statements that are
misleading, only impose a single uniform standard—that of falsity.250
The “based on health” language qualifying “requirements and
prohibitions” in the preemption clause of the FCLAA could be analo-
gized to the “of the type” language qualifying “requirements” in
§ 343-1(a) of the NLEA under the analysis of Altria.  Section § 343-
1(a) prohibits states from establishing “any requirement . . . for the
labeling of food” that is “of the type” of the requirements imposed in
certain subsections of the misbranding provisions, but that is not iden-
tical to those requirements.251  Following the reasoning in Altria, the
deceptive labeling claims predicated on a general duty not to deceive
may not constitute a requirement that is “of the type” of requirements
imposed in the enumerated misbranding subsections.  The misbrand-
ing subsections generally provide label requirements for information
that food labels must include in order for the food to avoid being
deemed “misbranded.”252  For example, under § 343(k), a food that
contains artificial flavoring, artificial coloring, or chemical preserva-
tives is required to bear a label stating that fact.253  Under
§ 343(q)(1)(C), barring some exemptions, a food that is intended for
human consumption and is offered for sale is required to bear a label
providing the total number of calories derived from any source and
derived from the total fat in each serving size or other unit of measure
of the food.254  These requirements impose duties on a category of
food products to disclose specific pieces of information on the label.
On the other hand, the consumer-protection laws under which de-
ceptive labeling claims are brought, like the state law in Altria, impose
general duties not to deceive or mislead.255  They do not impose rules
or duties that are “of the type” imposed in the misbranding subsection
because they do not provide specific label disclosures or prohibitions.
In fact, these duties do not require anything specific of a defendant
but, to the contrary, simply prohibit a defendant from engaging in
conduct that is likely to have a certain effect on consumers.  In accor-
dance with Altria, the uniform standard imposed by fraud claims
would not impede the NLEA’s purpose of preventing states from
249. Id. at 79.
250. Id. at 80.
251. 21 U.S.C. § 343-1(a) (2012).
252. Id. § 343.
253. Id. § 343(k).
254. Id. § 343(q)(1)(C).
255. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17500 (West 2008).
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adopting inconsistent standards for nutrient labeling.256  Consumer
fraud claims may actually help spur progress in the regulation of nutri-
tional information under the NLEA.257
D. Proper Express Preemption Analysis for
Deceptive Labeling Claims
Under a proper preemption analysis, the majority of deceptive la-
beling claims, including those that have been found to be expressly
preempted under the NLEA,258 would not be preempted.  Courts’
analyses have generally focused on the particular ingredients or label
features involved in the alleged deception to determine whether any
of those aspects are expressly regulated under the preemptive provi-
sions listed in the preemption clause.259  Generally, if they are regu-
lated, and the label complies with the FDCA requirements applicable
to those ingredients or features, the claims are preempted; if the
claims involve ingredients or features that are not regulated, the
claims may proceed in court.260  However, this analysis that focuses on
the particular ingredients or label features skips the step of determin-
ing what type of requirement is being imposed by the deceptive label-
ing claim.  When making this determination, courts should look to the
gravamen of the complaint, or what constitutes the heart of the plain-
tiff’s grievance with the food label.261  As explained above, deceptive
labeling claims generally impose only the requirement not to be false
or misleading.262  Preemption would occur only when the only way for
256. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
257. See infra notes 271–97 and accompanying text.
258. E.g., Carrea v. Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc., 475 F. App’x 113, 115 (9th Cir. 2012);
Turek v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 662 F.3d 423, 425–26 (7th Cir. 2011); Samet v. Proctor & Gamble Co.,
No. 5:12–CV–01891 PSG, 2013 WL 3124647, at *6 (N.D. Cal. June 18, 2013).
259. See supra notes 147–71 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 147–71 and accompanying text.
261. See Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., No. CV 11-05379 MMM (AGRx), 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 154750, at *9–27 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2011).  In Briseno, the plaintiff sued the manufac-
turer of a canola oil product with a label stating that it was “100% Natural.” Id. at *4.  The
plaintiff alleged that this was misleading because the product contained plants grown from ge-
netically modified seeds and asked the court to order ConAgra “to adopt and enforce a policy
that requires appropriate disclosure of [genetically modified] ingredients.” Id. at *4–6.  The
court found this particular request for relief to be preempted as it would impose a requirement
different or additional to those of the FDCA. Id. at *26–27.  However, the court allowed the
claim itself proceed, finding that the plaintiff’s “central argument” was simply that the label
statement was misleading, rather than the argument that the defendant needed to take specific
action, such as indicating genetically modified ingredients in the ingredient listing or refraining
from using the common name of canola oil. Id. at *17.  Thus, it did not invoke the preemptive
provisions of the FDCA. Id.
262. See supra notes 251–57 and accompanying text.  There is a caveat to this analysis in that
is likely not applicable to health claims that are preapproved by the FDA. Cf. Riegel v. Med-
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a defendant food manufacturer to avoid the potential liability under
the claim is to take action that would violate federal labeling require-
ments, but it would be under conflict preemption, rather than express
preemption.263
Applying this analysis to the facts in Samet,264 the plaintiff’s claim
would not be preempted.  In Samet, the alleged deception was that the
product label contained vignettes of various berries, along with the
statement “made with real fruit,” while the product did not contain
berries, but only apple juice from concentrate.265  Applying this re-
fined interpretation, the court would determine that the gravamen of
the plaintiff’s complaint to be that this combination of label features is
misleading in light of the fact that the product contains no berries.  If
the plaintiff’s complaint asks for the court to order the defendant food
manufacturer to fix this product label by taking a certain action, the
court may disregard that as possibly preempted under the NLEA be-
cause it might impose a different or additional requirement; but the
court should not bar the plaintiff’s entire claim on this basis.  The po-
tential liability that the defendant faced in Samet only requires the
defendant food manufacturer to cure its product label of the mislead-
ing representation it bears.  It could do so either by changing its label
to clearly indicate that the fruits depicted are not actually contained in
the product, or forgoing its voluntary statements and designs, or alter-
ing them to make them unlikely to mislead.  Thus, the claim only im-
poses a requirement that is not covered by the preemption clause—
that a food label must not be misleading.266  Or framed alternatively,
the claim imposes identical requirements to those contained in the ap-
plicable preemptive provisions because the requirement not to be mis-
leading encompasses all of the other more specific requirements
provided in the FDCA.267
However, when the only way that a defendant food manufacturer
can avoid potential liability under the plaintiff’s claim is to violate the
FDCA or FDA, then the “impossibility” prong of conflict preemption
would likely apply.268  Because it would be impossible for a food man-
tronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008) (holding that the term “requirement,” used in a separate FDCA
preemption clause regarding the regulation of medical devices, indicated intent to preempt tort
claims based on defects of medical devices that were pre-approved by the FDA).
263. See supra notes 105–06, infra notes 268–70, and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 158–65 and accompanying text.
265. Samet v. Proctor & Gamble Co., No. 5:12–CV–01891 PSG, 2013 WL 3124647, at *6
(N.D. Cal. June 18, 2013).
266. See supra notes 179–213 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 179–213 and accompanying text.
268. Cf. Mutual Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013) (holding that because generic
drug manufacturers were federally required to use the exact same labels as their name-brand
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ufacturer to both comply with the federal law and avoid liability under
state law, the state law claim would be preempted as actually conflict-
ing with federal law.269  For example, if the claim in Carrea was based
on the rounding down of trans fat to zero in the nutrition-facts panel,
it would conflict with federal law, which requires trans fat to be repre-
sented as such in the nutrition-facts panel,270 and would therefore be
preempted.  A claim of deception based on a “0 grams trans fat” state-
ment on the front of a label would still be actionable.  This comports
with the statement’s increased potential for misleading consumers.
While a statement in the nutrition-facts panel serves more as a factor
to compare products, a statement on the front of the package func-
tions more as an advertisement designed to draw in consumers.
Moreover, the statement on the front of the package is voluntary, and
while allowed, is subject to the requirement not to be false or
misleading.
IV. IMPACT
Properly limiting the applicability of the NLEA preemption clause
to consumer deceptive labeling claims would allow states a greater
role in effecting the FDCA’s main goal of preventing false and mis-
leading food labeling.271  The regulatory enforcement efforts of the
FDA alone have been insufficient to realize the goals of the statute it
is charged with implementing.272  And the way that courts are apply-
ing the NLEA preemption clause prevents consumer suits from en-
forcing the FDCA’s general prohibition against misleading labeling
when the label otherwise complies with the federal regulations.273
This is problematic because, as illustrated in the cases discussed
above,274 aspects of a food label that comply with the applicable fed-
eral regulations are often used in conjunction with other unregulated
aspects to mislead consumers.
It cannot be denied that some of the very conduct that the FDA
permits, or even requires, still has obvious potential to mislead the
public.275  The rounding down of trans fat content at issue in Carrea
counterparts, a plaintiff’s tort claim based on the manufacturer’s failure to warn about the life-
threatening health risks associated with the drug was preempted as conflicting with federal law).
269. Id.
270. 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(1)(E) (2012); 2 C.F.R. § 101.9(c)(2)(ii) (2015).
271. H.R. REP. NO. 75-2139, at 1 (1938).
272. See infra notes 275–81 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 147–71 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 147–71 and accompanying text.
275. For a compilation of misleading labeling tactics that food manufacturers have been using
in recent years, see generally CTR. FOR SCI. IN THE PUB. INTEREST, FOOD LABELING CHAOS:
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may not seem very concerning at first glance.  However, the underly-
ing consumer concern—that even trace amounts of trans fats cause
significant adverse health effects276—has since been substantiated by
research and acknowledged by the FDA itself.  In November 2013, the
FDA released a tentative determination that partially hydrogenated
oils, the main dietary source of trans fat, are no longer generally rec-
ognized as safe.277  If finalized, the decision would mean that food
manufacturers will no longer be allowed to sell partially hydrogenated
oils without approval from the FDA as a food additive.278  The deter-
mination was prompted by scientific evidence that led health experts
to unanimously conclude that there is no safe minimum level for in-
dustrially produced trans fat that would not increase an individual’s
risk of chronic heart disease or have adverse effects on risk factors for
chronic heart disease.279
The fact that the FDA has been requiring manufacturers of prod-
ucts containing ingredients that may no longer be considered safe to
represent that they were free of that ingredient gives insight into the
constantly evolving nature of nutrition regulation.  Decisions like this
bring to light the practical reality that the FDA determinations and
resulting regulations do not always end up providing consumers with
label information that is not misleading.  While a consumer suit based
solely on the rounding down of trans fat in the nutrition-facts panel
would likely be preempted under conflict preemption,280 consumers
should still be able to challenge voluntary labeling that takes advan-
tages of requirements that may produce misleading labeling.281
Like traditional tort litigation, consumer-protection suits can pro-
vide a “safety net” and help fill in the gaps left by regulatory agencies
by deterring industry risk taking and compensating injured consum-
ers.282  This role is particularly important in the regulation of food la-
THE CASE FOR REFORM (2010), available at http://www.cspinet.org/new/pdf/food_labeling_chaos
_report.pdf.
276. See supra notes 166–71 and accompanying text; see also Chacanaca v. Quaker Oats Co.,
752 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1115 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (discussing scientific research incorporated into the
plaintiff’s complaint on the health risks associated with trans fats).
277. Tentative Determination Regarding Partially Hydrogenated Oils; Request for Comments
and for Scientific Data and Information, 78 Fed. Reg. 67,169 (Nov. 8, 2013).
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. See supra notes 105–06, 268–70, and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 268–70 and accompanying text.
282. David C. Vladeck, Preemption and Regulatory Failure Risks, in PREEMPTION CHOICE:
THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION 54, 56 (William W. Buz-
bee ed., 2009) [hereinafter PREEMPTION CHOICE].
In a perfect world, a regulatory agency would never lack the information, personnel,
statutory power, technical expertise, or other resources needed to deal with emerging
1152 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:1119
beling, as part of the saga of the rise of food labeling litigation is the
FDA’s futile struggle to control misleading and violative food labeling
among the growing number of food producers.283  In 2010, FDA Dep-
uty Commissioner for Foods Michael R. Taylor admitted that it was
unlikely that the FDA would “eradicat[e] questionable claims . . . any
time soon.”284  He went on:
We’re also conscious of the cleverness of marketing folks, who,
once we prove today’s claim is misleading, can readily come up with
another one tomorrow.  Going after them one-by-one with the legal
and resource restraints we work under is a little like playing Whac-
a-Mole, with one hand tied behind your back.285
Consumer deceptive labeling suits have the potential to be an effec-
tive mechanism to allow consumer-protection groups and plaintiff’s
attorneys to compel food manufacturers to cure their misleading la-
beling.  The Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI) began to
monitor food labels for deceptive practices and established a litigation
department in 2004.286  Through lawsuits and threats to sue, it has
convinced several large food manufacturers to change their mislead-
ing labeling to be more truthful to consumers.287  A threat to sue Aunt
Jemima Mills Company’s parent company, Pinnacle Foods Corpora-
tion (Pinnacle Foods), induced it to change the labeling of its “blue-
berry waffles,” which were labeled as such despite the fact that they
contained only “artificially flavored blueberry bits” made of sugar,
dextrose, partially hydrogenated soybean oil, soy protein concentrate,
and food dyes such as Blue 2 Lake and Red 40 Lake.288  Pinnacle
Foods agreed to change the label to more clearly indicate that the
blueberries were imitation and artificially flavored.289  It also con-
vinced Sara Lee Corporation to change the label for its “Soft &
Smooth Made With Whole Grain White Bread” to disclose that it only
contained 30% whole grains and remove its representation that the
hazards.  In the real world, however, agencies are often confronted with information
gaps, bureaucratic inertia, intransigent companies, resource constraints, political inter-
ference, and other handicaps that limit the capacity of the agency to act in the public
interest.
Id.
283. See Negowetti, supra note 209, at 7–10 (tracking the FDA’s unsuccessful attempts to
reduce misleading labeling since 2005).
284. Id. at 9 (quoting Michael Taylor, How the FDA Is Picking Its Food Label Battles, ATLAN-
TIC (July 19, 2010, 9:00 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2010/07/how-the-fda-is-
picking-its-food-label-battles/59927/).
285. Id. (quoting Taylor, supra note 284).
286. Id. at 7.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Negowetti, supra note 209, at 7.
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product was nutritionally equivalent to 100% whole wheat bread.290
Similarly, the threat of litigation convinced Cadbury Schweppes
Americas Beverages to stop labeling 7UP, which is made with high-
fructose corn syrup, as “All Natural.”291  However, the use of con-
sumer class actions to curb the deceptive tactics of food manufacturers
is threatened by an overbroad application of the NLEA’s express pre-
emption clause, which courts have used to bar meritorious misleading
label claims simply because the labels complied with some regula-
tions292 and needlessly complicating food labeling litigation.293
In the Bates opinion, the Supreme Court briefly discussed the policy
considerations in determining the scope of preemption of state tort
claims by FIFRA.294  The Court remarked that FIFRA contemplates
that pesticide labels will evolve over time.295  It then highlighted some
of the benefits of allowing state tort claims to operate within FIFRA’s
regulatory regime: “[the] EPA itself may decide that revised labels are
required in light of the new information that has been brought to its
attention through common-law suits.”296  And, as one preemption
commentator noted, “[P]rivate plaintiffs and their lawyers have incen-
tives to ferret out neglected information, and the different discovery
procedures of civil litigation can elicit information never considered in
the regulatory process.”297  These types of considerations, involving
growing bodies of scientific evidence and evolving information sys-
tems, resonate as especially relevant and analogous to the concerns
currently surrounding food labeling.  By drawing attention to ways in
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. See supra notes 147–71 and accompanying text.
293. See Diana R. H. Winters, The Magical Thinking of Food Labeling: The NLEA as a Failed
Statute, 89 TUL. L. REV. 815, 850 (2015) (describing the analysis in a food labeling preemption
case as “intensive, time-consuming, and disputable” and stating that “[b]ecause . . . of the com-
plexity of the regulatory scheme and the level of specificity at which preemption must be deter-
mined, a large amount of judicial resources are being expended in the determination of these
preliminary issues”).  The current preemption analysis leads judges down a path that requires
them to interpret ambiguous and technical FDA regulations and make tedious factual determi-
nations. See, e.g., Lilly v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 743 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2014) (in which the court
had to determine whether the flavored coating on sunflower seeds was meant to be ingested in
order to determine whether the FDCA required its sodium content to be disclosed); Red v.
Kraft Foods, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 2d 1137 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (in which the court had to determine
whether or not the label statements “made with real vegetables” and “made with real ginger and
molasses” could be conceived as referring to the product flavor or nutrient content).
294. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 451 (2005).
295. Id.
296. Id. (quoting Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1541 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
297. William W. Buzbee, Conclusion, to PREEMPTION CHOICE, supra note 282, at 301, 303–04
(summing up a point made by Thomas O. McGarity, The Regulation–Common Law Feedback
Loop in Nonpreemptive Regimes, in PREEMPTION CHOICE, supra note 282, at 235, 235–36).
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which food labeling can deceive despite otherwise complying with the
applicable federal labeling requirements, deceptive food labeling suits
brought by consumers can play an important role in the evolution and
advancement of food labeling regulation.  For this reason, courts
should be careful not to give the NLEA’s preemption clause a greater
scope than Congress intended.
V. CONCLUSION
The NLEA’s preemption clause expressly prohibits states from im-
posing labeling requirements that are not identical to the federal re-
quirements provided in certain subsections of the FDCA.298  Courts
have allowed defendants to use this preemption clause to successfully
dismiss deceptive food labeling claims brought under state consumer-
protection laws, when the particular label features at issue comply
with the applicable federal requirements.  However, these courts have
used an overbroad conception and improper applications of the pre-
emption clause to bar meritorious deceptive labeling claims.  Courts
should interpret the NLEA’s preemption clause more narrowly, so as
to mean that a state “requirement” that a food label cannot be decep-
tive does not come within its preemptive scope, and, thus, is not pro-
hibited.  Such an interpretation would allow deceptive food labeling
claims to avoid express preemption, even if the labeling features in-
volved invoked and complied with specific FDCA provisions given
preemptive effect.
The use of lawsuits against food manufacturers that engage in mis-
leading labeling can be a useful tool for consumers to help ensure that
the overwhelming packages they are exposed to in the grocery store
are truthful and informative as to the product’s ingredients and its
health implications.  While there has been a large influx of consumer
food labeling suits, courts should not misuse the federal preemption
clause of the NLEA as a tool to curb these suits.
Federal preemption case law makes it clear that the use of this doc-
trine should be carefully limited, especially when it comes to areas
traditionally regulated by the states, such as food labeling.299  By
keeping the inquiry focused on the facts and merits of the case, the
judicial system can serve to facilitate and supplement the FDA’s mis-
sion of preventing misleading food labeling.  While consumer class ac-
298. 21 U.S.C. § 343-1(a).
299. See supra notes 96–117, 214–57, and accompanying text.
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tions may not be the ideal manner in which to regulate food labels, it
has promise as a helpful tool in curbing the deceptive labeling, at least
until the inevitable regulatory overhaul comes about.
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